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Introduction 
The current U.S. National Security Strategy for fighting the war against terrorism is under attack 
as a policy that is unsustainable, unilateral and a marked departure from past U.S. principles. It 
calls for an open-ended war against terrorism that continues to be costly to the United States in 
both blood and treasure. Although the doctrine calls for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights around the world, it is perceived as being largely words with no action, and when action is 
called for, it is through force. To win the fight against terrorism an alternative strategy is needed. 
A strategy that is sustainable and can be supported at home and abroad—the strategy of 
containment. It is a strategy that succeeded in winning the Cold War and is capable of reclaiming 
America’s once high international stature. It is a sensible policy that relies on diplomacy, 
economic incentives, respect for international institutions and stresses the importance of allies for 
its success. However, not all aspects of the strategy of containment implemented during the Cold 
War will transfer to today’s war on terrorism.  
This paper presents the tenets of containment strategy. It evaluates its past application against 
the Soviet Union and the future challenges it faces in its application to terrorist organizations. 
Although the challenges are many, this paper argues that containment is a viable alternative to 
current U.S. policy and will help regain the country’s tradition of high moral standing. 
Current U.S. Strategy 
The current U.S. strategy for fighting terrorism is documented in the National Strategy for 
Combating Terrorism, the National Security Strategy, and speeches by President G.W. Bush. The 
strategy has been uniquely different in principle than any previous administration’s strategy and is 
often referred to as the “Bush Doctrine.” The U.S. strategy to combat terrorism was first published 
in February 2003 under the title “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.” The strategy’s top 
priority was explained as combating terrorism and securing the homeland from future attacks. It 
indicated that the fight against terrorism would use all available means: diplomatic, economic, law 
enforcement, financial, information, intelligence, and military. The strategy stated that the “United 
States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community in this fight against 
a common foe. If necessary, however, we will not hesitate to act alone, to exercise our right to 
self defense, including acting preemptively against terrorists to prevent them from doing harm to 
our people and our country.”[1] The strategy’s goal for defeating terrorism is listed as a 4D 
strategy: defeat, deny, diminish and defend. Defeating terrorism will require the denial of terrorist 
sanctuaries, the destruction of terrorist leadership and communications as well as the targeting of 
state sponsors and other organizations that help terrorists thrive. Denying terrorists sanctuary and 
support is the second goal. The United States will support weak states in order to enable them to 
fight terrorism as well as persuade reluctant states and act strongly against unwilling states. Also, 
the United States will focus on diminishing the underlying conditions that lead to terrorism, that is, 
win the war of ideas and reverse the spread of extremist ideologies. In the last phase the United 
States will defend its citizens both at home and abroad as well as the homeland through the 
implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security. This strategy focuses on 
preventing terrorist attacks within the United States while the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism focuses on fighting terrorism before it reaches the homeland.  
The latest National Strategy for Combating Terrorism was published in September 2006.[2] In this 
version, U.S. accomplishments in the fight against terrorism were presented. These included the 
killing or capturing of key Al-Qaeda leaders, the elimination of safe havens in Afghanistan, and 
the undermining of various financial supporters of Al-Qaeda. The strategy lists its continuing goal 
of defeating violent extremism as well as the creation of a global environment inhospitable to 
violent extremists. It includes attacking terrorists wherever they are, killing them and their leaders, 
and undermining their communications and propaganda messages. It also includes denying 
rogue states the ability to develop or otherwise acquire WMD that could end up in terrorist hands. 
Overall, the current policy for fighting the war on terrorism is to use every instrument of national 
power to kill or capture terrorists, deny them safe haven and cut off their sources of support.  
The March 2006 version of the National Security Strategy of the United States places its 
emphasis on domestic actions for protecting the homeland. It is based on two pillars: first, 
“promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity—working to end tyranny, to promote effective 
democracies, and to extend prosperity through free and fair trade.” The second is “confronting the 
challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies,” which means the United 
States will actively support democratic governments and movements.[3] The belief behind this is 
that democracy produces governments that are unlikely to support extremists and terrorists. It is 
the belief that “promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening 
international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting 
extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.”[4] Most important is the notion that democratic 
governments do not attack other democratic countries. This last belief by the Bush administration 
has been attributed to helping spur on the 2003 decision to invade Iraq where it was hoped there 
would be a domino effect spreading democracy throughout the Middle East.  
Within the Bush Doctrine, there is an overwhelming desire to seek the advancement of human 
dignity by helping create a world of democratic countries. The doctrine contends that 
championing freedom advances both U.S. interests as well as helps win the battle of ideas. The 
National Security Strategy of the United States advocates the promotion of democracy such that, 
“as we consider which approaches to take, we will be guided by what will most effectively 
advance freedom’s cause while we balance other interests that are also vital to the security and 
well being of the American people.”[5] Unfortunately, this statement can be interpreted either in 
support of regime change and forced democracy building as in Afghanistan or Iraq, or it can 
justify the continuing support of dictatorships such as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the sake of 
perceived stability. A criticism of this policy is that it has “paid little or no attention to the suffering 
and aspirations of the peoples living under such regimes, and upheld its stand on human rights 
very selectively and only in relation to its adversaries, not in respect of those it wished to 
subordinate.”[6] And, as stated by Dunn, “America acquiesced in, if not encouraged, the clamp-
down on radical opposition groups in autocratic states in pursuit of the War on Terrorism.”[7]  
Shapiro argues that the Bush Doctrine has many critical flaws. This includes giving the United 
States the right to act militarily anywhere in the world, including the policy of preemptive war as 
well as the right to unilateral action, essentially meaning the United States can and will flout 
international laws and act alone if it sees fit. Shapiro writes: “President Truman had described 
preemptive wars as ‘weapons of dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United 
States.’”[8] A harsher criticism came from Mamdani who indicated that preemptive war is the logic 
for genocide, “it is not accidental that most genocides have been carried out in times of war. The 
population is told: if you do not kill, you will be killed. You kill because you fear they may do to you 
what you are about to do to them.”[9] Additionally, the doctrine envisions a condition of 
permanent war and calls for regime change by replacing dictatorships with democracies by any 
means necessary, including violent invasion. Finally, the Bush doctrine can be summed up by a 
declaration made by President Bush immediately after 9/11: “you are either with us or with the 
terrorists.”[10] This statement asserts that the war against terrorism is decidedly one dictated by 
the United States and those nations that choose to assist will do so on the United States’ terms. 
This demonstrated to all a great arrogance of power. Furthermore, according to Cumings, the 
United States will “impose its will where it wants, when it wants, regardless of allied or world 
opinion.”[11] In all, the Bush Doctrine is an unsustainable policy of unilateralism that has been 
costly to the United States in blood, money and prestige. Shapiro indicates that the doctrine “has 
squandered much of America’s moral capital, strained traditional alliances in unprecedented ways 
with its haphazard unilateralism and weakened vital international institutions.”[12] Moreover, the 
Bush doctrine has eroded trust from the international community by shattering the belief “that the 
U.S. will not act recklessly as to put at risk the safety and security of the entire developed 
world.”[13] 
Nature of Fundamentalist Terrorism 
Throughout its history, America has suffered through and survived many terrorist attacks. As 
indicated in the February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, “The first major 
terrorist attack on New York City’s financial district, for instance, did not occur on September 11, 
or even with the 1993 truck bombing of the World Trade Center. It occurred September 16, 1920 
when anarchists exploded a horse cart filled with dynamite near the intersection of Wall and 
Broad Streets, taking 40 lives and wounding about 300 others.”[14] In the 1970s and 1980s 
terrorist organizations were generally secular and nationalist. Some of these organizations were 
disbanded through the use of law enforcement efforts and others with the application of pressure 
on the countries that supported them, which resulted in the loss of their physical bases of 
operation. The 1990s and on have seen an increase in religious-based terrorist movements, 
particularly that of Islamic extremists with Al-Qaeda being the vanguard. Prior to 9/11, Al-Qaeda 
had a physical base in Afghanistan. After 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001, the Taliban was removed from power and Al-Qaeda’s physical bases and training camps 
were no longer viable, except for a few locations near the Pakistani border region of Waziristan. 
Today’s current threat from fundamentalist terrorism is one consisting of a transnational 
movement of extremist organizations believed to be operating in more than sixty countries. Al-
Qaeda is still the movement’s vanguard, though it does not exert control over many of these other 
movements. Thus the enemy is flexible, dispersed and decentralized. However, the movement is 
still united through a common ideology that exploits Western interventions in the Muslim world as 
an attack on Islam and uses terrorism as a means to achieving its goals. As indicated in the 
September 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, “sophisticated use of the internet 
and media has enabled our terrorist enemies to communicate, recruit, train, rally support, 
proselytize, and spread their propaganda without risking personal contact.”[15] 
The Origin of Containment 
In order to understand the policy of containment the United States undertook against the Soviet 
Union, it is best to review the works of George Kennan, best known as the “Father of 
Containment.” His most notable publication on the subject is what is known as “The Long 
Telegram,” which was sent on February 22, 1946 to the State Department while he was assigned 
to Moscow. Kennan wrote that according to Stalin, the socialist center and the capitalist center 
would continue to battle each other for command of the world economy and the outcome of the 
battle would determine the fate of either nation. He stated: “we have here a political force 
committed fanatically to the belief that with [the] U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi, 
that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our 
traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet 
power is to be secure.”[16]  
His second publication, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” first indicated as being authored by X 
but later confirmed as being by Kennan, stated “Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the 
western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of 
counterforce… corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy,” and “the main 
element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient 
but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”[17] He argued that capitalist 
systems can live in peace with Russia and that the United States’ problem with them can be 
resolved without military conflict. Kennan also believed that the Russians were highly sensitive to 
the threat of a powerful force. He believed the United States should deal with Russia calmly, 
undermining their propaganda, educating the public of the realities of the situation as well as 
demonstrating the capabilities of our own system. He also indicated that the Soviet power “bears 
within it the seeds of its own decay.”[18] Furthermore, “to avoid destruction the United States 
need only measure up to its own best tradition and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great 
nation.”[19]  
This U.S. policy of Soviet containment contained political, economic and military components in 
confronting the Soviet threat all over the world. Years later, Kennan would argue that his 
containment policy was misunderstood as he only implied political and economic containment 
such that both covert actions as well as economic aid, similar to that undertaken in Europe by the 
Marshall Plan, would help isolate the Soviet Union and help decrease its influence. In an 
interview with David Gergen in 1996, Kennan stated “I found it easy to convince them (the U.S. 
Government) that this was a very dangerous group of men (the Soviets). But I couldn’t persuade 
them that their aspirations were political.”[20] He argued that the alteration from his intended, 
mainly political and economic containment, to that of military containment helped lead to the root 
causes of the Korean War and Vietnam War. He believed that the false understanding of his 
containment policy ended up militarizing U.S. foreign policy. In his containment strategy, Kennan 
also separated what he termed vital and peripheral interests. In the case of vital interests, war is 
deemed acceptable. The Cuban missile crisis was a vital interest, thus President Kennedy’s 
stand was correct, as was the U.S. action undertaken in 2001 in Afghanistan to remove the 
Taliban. The Vietnam War and the Iraq War are viewed as peripheral interests where diplomacy, 
economic incentives, sanctions and multilateral action by international institutions should have 
been the way to proceed. However, President Bush stated, “After September 11, the doctrine of 
containment just doesn’t hold any water, as far as I’m concerned.”[21]  
In summary, as indicated by Dunn, “In moving beyond containment and deterrence the 
administration was adopting a radically different approach to foreign policy that was much more 
assertive than previous policy and much more reliant on American power and a willingness to use 
it.”[22] 
Application of Containment 
The policy of containment has been increasingly brought to the forefront because of its success in 
the past and the fact that it offers hope for a better alternative to current policy. Gaddis argues 
that containment is worth considering, though not all aspects of Cold War containment are 
relevant to a post-9/11 world and instead argues for selective transferability. This is because the 
circumstances that gave rise to Cold War containment, sustained it and eventually made it 
successful are different from today’s environment. One of the arguments against containment is 
that it is a state-based strategy. The question then becomes, how can you deter a stateless entity? 
However, as stated by Gaddis, Al-Qaeda was not “an entirely stateless enemy.”[23] The United 
States knew Al-Qaeda predominantly resided in Afghanistan and still resides on the border 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan today.  
Kennan believed that exploiting contradictions between the Soviet Union and world communism 
was an important tenet of the containment strategy, as it would help lead to the Soviets defeating 
themselves. This same reasoning could also be applied post-9/11. States seek to survive with a 
functioning economic program and this is something fundamentalist terrorists do not currently 
aspire to. With sufficient economic incentives states that wish to thrive can often be pressured to 
reduce or eliminate their support of terrorists. Furthermore, the moderate majority of the Islamic 
world should be engaged to help counter the incorrect and radical ideology to which the 
fundamentalist terrorists adhere. This should be done first and foremost by changing the 
perception that the war on terror is a war against Islam as is currently perceived by many in the 
Muslim world.  
Containment also stresses the importance of allies. The Cold War brought forth NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact along with the drive to attain more allies than the other side. After the end of the 
Cold War, the United States has been increasingly quick to utilize military force with the success 
of the Gulf War and incursions into Bosnia and Kosovo. As a result, there is the fear that “in the 
effort to resist an authoritarian adversary, the United States itself might become authoritarian 
whether through the imposition of a command economy or through the abridgment of democratic 
procedures.”[24] 
Challenges to Containment 
The question has been raised: can containment be applied to the terrorism threat? What are the 
similarities and differences between the Soviet threat and the terrorist threat and is containment 
relevant to the present circumstances? Answering these questions will provide us with an 
understanding of the challenges containment faces as well as establishing what is applicable.  
Both the Soviet Union during the Cold War and today’s terrorist organizations have not proven to 
be amenable to persuasion or reasoning, as both the Soviet outlook and the current state of mind 
of terrorist organizations are antithetical to the principles of the United States. The Soviet and 
terrorist organizations had/have both regional and global ambitions as both wanted/want their 
ideology spread, and were/are anti-democracy and/or capitalism.  
How can containment deal with the threat of terrorism, which is quite different than the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union (a nation-state), in that, is it applicable considering the transnational 
nature of the threat? The notion of containment asserts that “the adversary to be contained share 
one’s own sense of risk.”[25] The reality is that terrorist organizations do not exist in a vacuum 
and they rely on enabling states and local populations to accomplish their goals. These enabling 
states provide sanctuary for training and a safe haven to conduct their business unimpeded. 
Without territory a terrorist group cannot pose a serious threat. As such, “Terrorist groups might 
not themselves always be feasible targets of containment, but enabling regimes certainly can 
be.”[26] For example, the containment of Libya, especially through UN sanctions, helped end its 
state-sponsorship of terrorism.  
Another issue raised by Kennan was nourishing the competition and the drifting apart between 
the Soviet Union and international communism, which further weakened the Soviet Union. This 
same principle can work today by raising the tensions between enabling states and terrorist 
movements as well as between moderate Muslims and Muslim extremists. State governments 
are primarily concerned with domestic issues while terrorist organizations are not. Therefore, 
friction and competition can be applied to drive wedges between them. For example, Saudi 
Arabia demonstrated little concern for Al-Qaeda and the war against terrorism as long as terrorist 
attacks were conducted outside the country. However, once Al-Qaeda started committing terrorist 
acts within the nation, Saudi Arabia became much more serious about joining the war against 
terrorism. This proves it is important to nourish differences. Another example that has occurred 
recently is the Anbar Awakening in Iraq. Al-Qaeda and Sunni insurgents had previously fought 
together against the United States in Iraq’s Anbar province. However, the brutality of Al-Qaeda 
against the Iraqi people has caused the Sunnis to side with the United States against Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq.  
An important issue is how to contain terrorists who are willing to die for their cause. Suicide 
bombers have been around in many different cultures and religions for ages, and they generally 
cannot be influenced through reasoning or incentives. Suicide bombers do not act alone, which 
means their leaders and organizations can be subject to containment. As indicated by Shapiro, 
the “focus for a national security policy is those who plan and orchestrate the missions. They play 
by different rules from those of the bombers they deploy.”[27] As such, it is the leaders of these 
organizations, the ones that extol the “glories of martyrdom” to help influence and control recruits 
and who are generally located in a set nation-state, that could be contained. These leaders are 
the ones that drive their organization while at the same time are not actively seeking “martyrdom” 
for themselves. Essentially, “Terrorism is a political phenomenon. Consequently, until the political 
problems that give rise to contemporary global terrorism are resolved, the struggle against it will 
not be successful.”[28] Since many of these terrorists reside within their place of attack, this 
emphasizes the notion of combating the ideology and the cause, and increasing tensions to break 
the terrorist mantra. Al-Qaeda still maintains a base of support on the border between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan. As defeating Al-Qaeda is vital to the United States’ national interests, continuing 
the fight in Afghanistan through a coalition of forces is essential for success in eroding the Al-
Qaeda threat.  
Weak states pose another challenge to containment— they are first in need of assistance. 
Multilateral policies can be developed to help weak states secure their borders, help in economic 
development and help find solutions to their internal challenges and conflicts. Resolving these 
issues can help provide them with both the means and will to stand up to terrorism. Somalia is a 
good example of a country in such dire need of international help while at the same time needing 
to contain the terrorist threat that resides within its borders.  
An additional concern is the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). There is a concern of 
rogue states producing them and terrorists acquiring them. As indicated by Allison and Kokoshin, 
“Preventing nuclear terrorism will require no less imagination, energy and persistence than did 
avoiding nuclear war between the superpowers over four decades of Cold War.”[29] Terrorists 
generally do not have the means to produce WMD but they can acquire them by theft, illicit 
purchase, or through an enabling state. The effort to stop this requires deep sustained 
cooperation by all WMD-empowered states to restrict the sale and guarantee the security of such 
materials. In addition, intelligence sharing and counter-proliferation is necessary to prevent the 
production or acquisition of such materials. Current U.S. policy appears to have had the opposite 
effect on WMD production. President Bush’s State of the Union address after 9/11 in which he 
described North Korea, Iran and Iraq as part of an Axis of Evil has been counter-productive.[30] 
North Korea and Iran both saw the U.S. attack and occupation of Iraq and likely assumed that 
they were next. As such, both nations began to increase their attempts at nuclear armament. 
Current U.S. policy towards North Korea has been one of containment and has been showing 
progress as North Korea has begun reporting on its nuclear weapons. Regarding Iran, U.S. policy 
has not chosen containment and instead uses threatening and aggressive rhetoric. This has not 
succeeded as yet in convincing Iran to give up its alleged WMD program. Under a policy of 
containment with respect to countries such as Iran, strong multilateral commitments could be 
utilized to prevent negative outcomes without the threat of unilateral war, thus ensuring greater 
international cooperation. Fortunately, this is currently happening by working with our allies to 
negotiate with and contain Iran.  
Additionally, the United States should assist in the spread of democracy around the world. This is 
not one of Kennan’s strategies of containment, but it is an important aspect to containing terrorist 
organizations. This is not to say that democracy completely eradicates terrorism, but it can 
provide hope to people and undermine many of the causes or support for terrorism. Supporting 
repression, even by allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, fosters breeding grounds for terrorism 
and erodes America’s international credibility. However, spreading democracy does not mean 
forcible regime change, which likely results in the loss of cooperation from other democratic allies 
as has occurred in the current war in Iraq. Spreading democracy requires the supporting of 
“indigenous democratic forces and to withhold support from their authoritarian opponents” without 
fighting their battle for them.[31] Democracy cannot be imposed by an outside power and takes 
years to develop on its own. The sanctions applied to South Africa during the 1980s along with 
the support of the local population and allies are an example of successful peaceful democratic 
reform. On the other hand, the war in Iraq is an example of forcible regime change that has not 
only failed to gain cooperation from allies but also produced fodder for international anti-American 
sentiment as well as increased recruitment for terrorist organizations. However, if it should ever 
become the vital interest of the United States to effect a regime change, success “requires not 
only the acquiescence of the target population, but the long term support of the American public 
and the buy-in of America’s allies and coalition partners.”[32] 
Conclusion 
The application of a containment strategy against fundamentalist terrorist organizations faces 
several challenges. To understand these challenges, both the similarities and the differences 
between the Soviet Union during the Cold War era and current terrorist organizations were 
analyzed. Terrorist organizations do not exist in a vacuum, they rely on enabling states, and so 
enabling states can be contained to undermine their support for terrorists. The competition 
between the Soviet Union and international communism is similar to that of the conflict today 
between radical Islamists and moderate Muslims. This can be exploited to help these terrorist 
organizations defeat themselves. The United States should end its support of dictatorships, thus 
providing hope to people who might otherwise turn to terrorism. With respect to weak states, 
assistance is imperative—especially the improvement of economic conditions. Another issue is 
the threat of WMD, which can be contained as well.  
As the U.S. National Security Strategy indicated, the United States cannot win the war on 
terrorism by military power alone, it needs to win the war of ideas. All of the above challenges can 
be met but only with the help of allies. The United States will need to work hard to gain back the 
support and trust of those at home and abroad. Needless to say, future use of containment will 
require the rebuilding and shoring up of the building blocks of international cooperation. In 
conclusion, the United States was successful in containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
and today, through international cooperation including with states of the former Soviet Union, it 
can be successful at containing extremist terrorist organizations, as well.  
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox, please email 
ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe." There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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